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Berger: Water Law - Cessation of Return Flow as a Means of Complying with

COMMENTS
WATER LAW-CESSATION OF RETURN FLOW AS
A MEANS OF COMPLYING WITH
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS*
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 has
set a course of water quality improvement for this nation
which translates into increasingly stringent effluent limitations for water users.' As a consequence, municipalities
and industrial plants in some locations are finding it more
economical to cease all water discharge than to restore the
quality necessary for water returned to the streams from
which it is diverted.2 The total containment, no-discharge
pollution control systems implemented by these users substitute evaporation of water from sewage and industrial effluent for treatment and discharge of purified water. All opportunities for subsequent use of the water downstream are
thereby terminated. The purpose of this Comment is to
examine questions of policy and legality with respect to the
creation and continuation of total containment water quality
control systems.
Underlying water laws and policies is the goal of obtaining "maximum social satisfactions" from the water.'
To achieve this goal, rules of reasonable use and beneficial
use have been developed within the basic water law doctrines
of riparian rights and prior appropriation. Under the general concept of reasonable beneficial use,4 maximum utilization is promoted by restricting water rights to those users
who can make some productive or purposeful use of the water
and limiting the amount of each right to that necessary for
achieving the user's purpose.'
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming

*This Comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of
the University of Wyoming.
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp.
V 1975).
2. A total containment system has been in use, for example, in Cheyenne,
Wyoming, and the systems are contemplated in the Wyoming communities
of Buffalo and Rawlins.
3.

TRELEASE,

CASES AND

MATERIALS

ON WATER

LAW-RESOURCE

USE

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 18 (2d ed. 1974).
4. See generally Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the
Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1957).
S. See text accompanying notes 8-12, infra.
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The legality of total containment systems under riparian
law, as it has been adopted in many American jurisdictions,"
will depend on the reasonableness of use in light of the correlative rights of all riparian owners. While much of the
following discussion will be relevant to the determination
of reasonableness under the riparian reasonable use doctrine,
the analysis herein will be phrased principally in terms of
the legal viability of total containment systems under the
prior appropriation doctrine adopted in the states of the
arid West where the water allocation problems are far more
crucial.
Only one facet of the legal problem presented by total
containment systems is answered by the beneficial use determination under prior appropriation law. When an established water user seeks to implement a total containment
system, it must be determined whether this change which
increases consumption is, on the one hand, a reuse or more
efficient use-which is usually permissible without qualification-or, on the other hand, a change of use-which is contingent on preserving the rights of other water users.' The
reasons supporting this distinction appear never to have
been clarified by the courts. It can be surmised, however,
that the goal of maximum utilization and considerations of
practical accommodation lie behind the distinction. Incremental improvements in the internal economies of individual
users are encouraged since the change is consistent with
efficiency in the complete economic system-improvement in
one portion improves the whole. Yet, to prevent disruption
of the economic system, the established rights of all users
are protected from significant changes by one user who increases internal economies at the expense of other users-because of the offsetting effects, the whole system does not
necessarily benefit from such a change. Whether the differing cases can be explained with this policy distinction is
questionable, but each decision and rule presumably has some
basis in the goal of maximum utilization of water as a
scarce resource.
6. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. '781, 790 (1903).
7. See text accompanying notes 38-67, infra.
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Proceeding now to an analysis of the beneficial use concept, this Comment will subsequently examine the reusechange of use dichotomy in greater detail and conclude with
an analysis of the social and economic issues raised by the
problem of cessation of return flow incident to the operation
of a total containment pollution control system.
THE RIGHT TO CONSUME ALL WATER DIVERTED

The initial question presented in determining the legality of a total containment system is whether a water user
can ever acquire a right to consume by evaporation all water
diverted and thereby allow no return flow to the stream from
which the original diversion is made. At this point, the discussion deals not with questions of relative priority, but
with the question of whether the intentional disposal of water
by evaporation incident to industrial or municipal uses is a
beneficial use for which water may be appropriated.
The general policy of the western states, where water is
among the most important of scarce resources, is to encourage
the most efficient uses of water.' To that end, waste of water
is generally prohibited by constitution or statute and beneficial use is made the basis, measure and limit of the right
to use water.9 Stated differently, wasteful application
is not included in the term "use" for which an appropriation
may be made."
Because the amount of an appropriation is limited to
the amount necessary for the actual needs of the appropria8.

Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 237 P.2d 93, 98 (1951) ; Scherck v. Nichols,
55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74, 78 (1939).
9. E.g., Aiuz. Ray. STAT. § 45-101(B) (1956); CAL. CONsT. art. XIV, § 3 and
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 1240 (West 1971); N.M. CONST. art XVI, § 3 and
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-11-2 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 540.610, .720 (1975);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 46-1-4, -1-8, -5-5 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 73-1-3 (1953); WYo. STAT. § 41-2 (1957).
10. In re Water Rights of Deschutes River & Tributaries, 134 Or. 623, 286 P.
563, 577, modified, 134 Or. 623, 294 P. 1049 (1930), modified, 148 Or. 389,
36 P.2d 585 (1934). If the running of effluent into an evaporation pond is
thought to require reservoir rights, the beneficial use problem persists, for
storage rights are strictly limited to the amount which can be beneficially
used. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co.,
475 P.2d 548, 550 (Wyo. 1970), supplemented, 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971).
Storage itself is not a beneficial use. Lindblom v. Round Valley Water Co.,
178 Cal. 450, 173 P. 994, 997 (1918).
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tor or the specific purpose for which appropriation is made,"
a water user has the duty to return to the stream all surplus or waste water so that future use can be made of it."
Therefore, if the consumption of water by evaporation as a
pollution control method is to be recognized as rightful, it
must be found to be a beneficial use in itself or part of the
principal beneficial use for which the water has been diverted,
rather than wasteful application or improper retention of
surplus.
Beneficial use is, in some respects, a vague legal concept, the parameters of which are difficult to define.18 The
Alaska Legislature has undertaken to provide some guidance
by defining "beneficial use" as "a use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons or the public, that is
reasonable and consistent with the public interest."' 4 Presumably, any particular application of water will not be attempted unless beneficial to the appropriator, so the determination of beneficial use is based essentially on the standards of reasonableness and public interest; consequently,
11. McKinney v. Smith, 21 Cal. 374, 381-84 (1863); Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal.
33, 38 (1859); Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo.
565, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922) ; Nichols v. Hufford, 21 Wyo. 477, 133 P. 1084,
1086 (1913).
12. Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 11; Brian v.
Fremont Irrigation Co., 112 Utah 220, 186 P.2d 588, 590 (1947). But see
Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143 P.2d
12 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 793 (1944), which held the City of Los
Angeles liable for damages caused by the return of surplus water to a
stream which had previously been entirely diverted by the city. The court
refused to accept the city's argument that it was not only permitted, but
required to return surplus water to the stream. Id. at 16.
The rule for disposition of water under riparian law is equivalent to
the general prior appropriation rule: all surplus water-that in excess of
a reasonable amount for consumptive use-must be returned to the stream.
Hackensack Water Co. v. Village of Nyack, 289 F. Supp. 671, 6577 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Consequently, a user that diverts large quantities of water from
a stream, depositing all of the excess over consumptive uses in a different
watershed, has been found to be diverting water unreasonably when lower
riparian owners are thereby deprived of needed water. Id.
13. See generally 1 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 9-19, 522-46 (1971), Trelease, supra, note 4.
14. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.260 (1971). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 46-1-6(6) (1967) which defines "beneficial use" as "any use of water
that is reasonable and useful and beneficial to the appropriator, and at
the same time is consistent with the interests of the public in the best
utilization of water supplies"; and TExAs WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.002
(Vernon 1972) which defines "beneficial use" as "use of the amount of
water which is economically necessary for a purpose authorized by this
chapter, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are used
in applying the water to that purpose."
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it necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case.' 5 A
few states have listed those activities which constitute beneficial use,16 but the lists do little to answer the beneficial use
question as it relates to a specific new application of water
since a determination must still be made, on the basis of
public interest and reasonableness, of whether the new application is a contemplated part of one of the uses enumerated.
When the criteria of public interest and reasonableness
are applied, the beneficial use determination is, at least partially, based on a comparative consideration of the relative
values which can be produced by alternative applications of
water.' A consumptive use which makes no significant
contribution to increased productivity or to efficiency
through cost saving is likely to fail the beneficial use test
and be termed waste, for it makes no contribution to attainment of the goal of maximum utilization of water.
Whether consumption of water in a particular manner is
a beneficial use depends not only on the relative benefits
which can be produced with the water when applied in different ways, but also on the availability of alternative means
of accomplishing a certain task which would not involve the
consumption of water. For example, the use of water to
carry debris from a reservoir to keep it out of hydroelectric
plant turbines is wasteful where other means of debris disposal are available or can be devised to accomplish the same
end. 8
15. See City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(1939).
16. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.260 (1971) lists domestic, agricultural, irrigation,
industrial, manufacturing, mining, power, public, sanitary, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses; ARiZ. RV. STAT. § 45-141 (Supp. 1976) lists
domestic, municipal, irrigation, stock watering, water power, recreation,
wildlife and mining uses; TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.023 (Vernon
1972) lists domestic, municipal and industrial uses, irrigation, mining,
hydroelectric power, navigation, recreation and pleasure, stock raising,
public parks, and game preserves. The listing provided by the California
Legislature may, however, be more useful in determining whether the
application under discussion is a beneficial use, for, in addition to the
common uses (domestic, irrigation, municipal, industrial, preservation and
enhancement of wildlife, recreational, mining and power purposes), "any
uses specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control plan"
are specifically included within the contemplated beneficial uses. CAI.
WATE CODE § 1257 (West 1971).
17. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971).
18. In re Water Rights of Deschutes River & Tributaries, supra note 10.
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Applying a similar analysis to the total containment
problem, the Colorado Supreme Court has indicated that disposal by evaporation might be permitted where other methods
of disposal or treatment are relatively expensive. 9 For public policy reasons, however, "this right to destroy the water
by evaporation can exist only when there is no other practicable method of disposing of the sewage ....

."-" Conse-

quently, where there are not compelling physical or economic
reasons for implementation of total containment operations,
the duty to return surplus water to the stream following the
initial use would likely require purification and discharge.
Beneficial Use as a Changing Concept
A most notable aspect of the beneficial use concept is
that it is not constant. An application which is a beneficial
use before demands on the water supply become excessive
may not be considered beneficial in an era of scarcity." Conversely, it may be only after the passage of time that courts
and legislatures recognize the importance of new uses such
as the maintenance of stream flow adequate to dilute polluted effluent22 or to preserve aesthetic values and recreational opportunities." The changing nature of beneficial use
indicates that the determination of whether disposal of waste
water by evaporation is within a user's appropriation rights
must be made in light of the needs and constraints of the
time. In particular, increasingly stringent water quality
standards may require economical innovations in pollution
disposal, while simultaneously expanding demands on the
water supply suggest that treatment for subsequent use may
be necessary even though the financial burden on the polluter
may be heavy.
19. Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 11.
20. Id. at 683.
21. Trelease, supra note 4, at 17. This is not to say that an appropriation will
expire when the use to which the water is put becomes uneconomical due
to changed conditions, but that a new appropriation may not be permitted
for the use which was considered sufficient to support an appropriation
under the circumstances of a prior period in time. But see the text accompanying notes 24 and 27, infra, which suggests that an old application of
water once considered acceptable, may, in fact, be terminated when it is
considered wasteful under changed circumstances.
22. Id. at 20.
23. State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Administration, 96 Idaho
440, 530 P.2d 924, 928 (1974).
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Because of the changing nature of beneficial use, the
right to demand or keep water for an application merely
incidental to the user's purpose in diverting water is somewhat similar to a water user's right to continue utilization
of an old means of diversion under changed conditions. In
cases involving the protection of means of diversion, the
right to make use of water in a quantity in excess of that
actually needed for the user's principal operation exists
where reasonable and efficient under the particular conditions. 4 Some courts have held, however, that more sophisticated methods must be adopted as demands on the water
supply increase with the passage of time and formerly acceptable methods of handling water are termed unduly wasteful. Where the application of water in a particular fashion
is outlawed as wasteful despite a record of prior application
in such fashion, the court may find that a right to so apply
the water never existed; the user was merely acting under
a privilege which existed only so long as did an abundance
of water."
So it is that evaporation of water to meet pollution restrictions may have been or may be a privilege in times and
places of abundant water supplies. In conditions of scarcity,
however, such an application may not be a beneficial use
and the user may have no right to continue such consumption of water."
24. State ex rel. Crowley v. District Court of Sixth Judicial Dist., 108 Mont.
89, 88 P.2d 23, 29 (1939).
25. In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 144 P. 505, 528 (1914), modified, 74 Or.
592, 146 P. 475 (1915).
26. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Or. 523, 336 P.2d 884 (1959).
27. The utilization of total containment systems may turn out to be an ephemeral phenomenon for a very different reason. The structure of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V
1975) with increasing water quality standards and requirements that increasingly advanced technology be applied to control water pollution may
have implications for the permanence of the systems as solutions to effluent
disposal problems. While a total containment system may be included within
the category of "best practicable control technology currently available"
for limitation of effluents which the Act requires to be in use in 1977,
P 301(b) (1) (A) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A), it may not be the
'best available technology economically achievable" which must be implemented by 1983, § 301 (b) (2) (A) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2) (A).
On the other hand, a total containment system, since it completely eliminates
polluted discharge, may be the best available technology and, therefore,
usable or even required under the 1983 standards. The ambiguity and lack
of interpretation of these standards makes speculation either way quite
risky.
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Special Rights of Municipalities
The indication of some cases has been that a disposition
which may be termed wasteful or unreasonable in the case of
an industrial plant or other private entity may be a reasonable and beneficial use for a municipality. Some courts have
adopted special rules in cases involving use of water by cities,
holding that a city is not limited in its appropriation to the
amount needed by its citizens at the time its right is adjudicated, but is entitled to appropriate sufficient water for probable future demands," that a city can dispose of surplus
water up to the amount of its diversion even though it returns no water for junior appropriators," and that a city
can impound water for emergencies against the claim of
junior appropriators that it is not put to beneficial use."0
On the other hand, some courts have, in effect, declared
that the rights of a city can be no greater than the rights
of any other appropriator. Decisions have been rendered
limiting the right of a city to dispose of its surplus water"1
and denying a city the right to impound water in excess of
its actual needs. 2
Special municipal water rights, where they exist,"8 may
extend so far as to permit a city to consume its entire appropriation by evaporation when such disposition would not be
permissible in the case of a non-public entity; the Wyoming
Supreme Court, in Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond
Packing Co.," has recognized this possibility:
Even in this state, where the conservation of water
for irrigation is so important, we would not care to
28. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, supra note 15; Beus v. City of Soda
Springs, 62 Idaho 1, 107 P.2d 151 (1940); Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22
Wyo. 212, 137 P. 876, 880 (1914).
29. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P.
764 (1925); Holt v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 28.
30. Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo.
333, 54 P.2d 906, 915, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1936).
31. Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 11.
32. Gwynn v. City of Philipsburg, 156 Mont. 194, 4'78 P.2d 855, 857 (1970).
33. Special rights for municipal users also exist under the reasonable use rule
of the riparian doctrine. Consequently, that which is an unreasonable use
for an individual may be deemed reasonable if it is a municipal activity.
City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899).
34. Supra note 29.
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hold that in disposition of sewage the city could not
adopt some means that would completely consume
it. It might, we think, be diverted to waste places,
or to any chosen place where it would not become a
nuisance, without any consideration of the demands
of water users who might be benefited by its disposition in some other manner."
Wyoming Hereford Ranch held that the City of Cheyenne could dispose of its sewage water by sale and deposit the
water directly into the ditch of the buyer despite the claims
of downstream appropriators. On strikingly similar facts,
however, the Colorado Supreme Court held, in Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad,3" that the City of
Trinidad had no right to sell its purified sewage water to
an irrigating company in lieu of returning it to the stream.
Yet, the Colorado court, in dictum, noted that disposal of
city sewage by evaporation might be recognized as a rightful
disposition of water in the proper circumstances."
In a rational system structured to attain maximum
utilization of a scarce resource, the existence of special rights
for municipalities is difficult to justify. It may be quite
true that the domestic needs of city water users constitute
a higher priority item than do agricultural, industrial, power
and recreational needs. Also, the fact that cities have generally followed predictable growth patterns which have permitted competent planning for steady expansion of water
needs may explain the variations in beneficial use rules for
cities. But neither the priority of use nor the planning capabilities justify rules permitting cities to withhold water from
other productive uses at the expense of other users. Although
the high priority of municipal needs may require special
tools such as the power of eminent domain, municipalities
cannot reasonably be excepted from the operation of basic
water utilization laws. Consumption of a scarce resource in
a wasteful manner makes no sense, regardless of the consuming entity. The goal of maximum utilization cannot be at85. Id. at

772.
36. Supra note 11.
37. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
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tained where any user, even a high priority municipal user,
is able to prevent the utilization of water by subsequent users
or the transfer of water to a use which may be of greater
importance.
Despite the absence of sound economic reasons for distinguishing city water rights from others, the weight of
authority appears to recognize special municipal water rights
for which the reasonable beneficial use concept is construed
much more liberally; consequently, the identity of a user
proposing a total containment system may be a crucial factor
in determining the system's legality insofar as it depends
on application to a beneficial use. While Wyoming has recognized and Colorado has indicated that it would recognize the
right of a city to cease return flow on which other water
users have relied, it is by no means clear that such a right
would be recognized on the part of municipalities in other
states or on the part of private users in any state.
Whether the water user seeking to initiate a total containment program is a municipal user or a private user,
the question of whether consumption by evaporation is a
beneficial application of water such that the contemplated
disposition can be defended is not answered clearly by the
definition of beneficial use standing alone. The factors of
reasonableness and public interest suggest that the question
of whether such an application is to be termed a beneficial
use rather than waste can best be answered through an
analysis of the relevant social and economic considerations.
Following a discussion of the relative rights of appropriators in situations where the pattern of application of water
is changed, the social and economic factors involved here will
be analyzed more thoroughly.
RIGHTS OF JUNIOR APPROPRIATORS TO RETURN FLOW

Assuming that, in at least some cases, disposition of
polluted water by total containment and evaporation is found
to be a reasonable beneficial use so that it is possible to acquire a right to so utilize water, the question of viability of
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/2
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the system to withstand legal challenges revolves around the
relative rights of the user planning to cease discharge and
other water users affected thereby.
Generally, appropriators senior to the no-discharge user
will have the right, if upstream, to divert all water necessary to satisfy their prior appropriations and, if downstream, to compel the no-discharge user to reduce or cease
diversion of water altogether until the senior appropriations
are satisfied. Consequently, the question of whether the cessation of return flow is permissible does not arise in the
context of a conflict with a prior appropriator. The question
will arise with respect to the relative rights of the nodischarge user and junior appropriators-both downstream
juniors who depend directly on the return flow to satisfy
their appropriations and upstream juniors who will lose
their water to the calls of downstream appropriators senior
to themselves if those downstream users no longer have the
no-discharge user's return flow to satisfy their appropriations.
The language of western case law has distinguished those
situations in which the application of water in a manner
differing from that in the past is a "change of use," which
is subject to strict limitations, or is no more than a "reuse"
or "more efficient use" within the contemplation of the
original appropriation. Cases have applied rules which differ widely depending on this classification; each category of
cases is discussed separately in the following material.
Change of Use
The obstacle facing an appropriator intending to change
his place of diversion or place or manner of use is the burden of proving that the change will not injure junior appropriators. The well-known Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden88 case held that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their appropriations and
38. 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954).
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may resist proposed changes which will adversely affect their
rights. The right of an appropriator to change his place of
diversion or place or nature of use will, therefore, be denied
where the change will result in increased consumption or
will otherwise injuriously affect junior appropriators. 9 The
rules protecting junior appropriators from changes in use
or place of use which result in increased consumption or injury have been codified by some states such as Wyoming
where the appropriator making such a change is limited to
the historic amount of diversion, historic rate of diversion
and historic consumption, and is not permitted to decrease
the historic amount of return flow or otherwise injure existing appropriators.4 "
A great number of the cases providing for the protection
of the vested rights of junior appropriators to continuation
of stream conditions at the time of their appropriations deal
with proposals of prior appropriators to change points of
diversion. 4 ' These cases clearly make such changes conditional on preservation of junior rights. Yet, the Colorado
Supreme Court has recently held, in Metropolitan Denver
Sewage Disposal District No. 1 v. Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co., 2 that changes of point of return of waste
water are not governed by the same rules as changes of point
of diversion. The court denied the existence of a vested right
in downstream appropriators to maintenance of the same
point of return flow. On its surface, the MetropolitanDenver
decision appears to effectively deny junior appropriators a
right to return flow since the prior user is free to move his
point of discharge from above to below any junior appropriator's point of diversion. Yet, the decision was rendered on
the assumption that the waste water, although it could be
returned at a different point, had to be returned to the
39. Id.; Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Kidd v. Laird, 15
Cal. 161 (1860); Fort Collins Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld
Irrigation Co., 61 Colo. 45, 156 P. 140 (1915); East Bench Irrigation Co.
v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954), reaffirmed,
5 Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603 (1956).
40. WYO. STAT. § 41-4.1 (Supp. 1975).
41. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 38,
at 635; Farmer's Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Town of Lafayette, 93
Colo. 173, 24 P.2d 756, 758 (1933).
42. 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972).
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stream for the benefit of junior appropriators.4 The essence
of the Colorado controversy, as the court noted, was merely
whether Denver, the prior appropriator which changed its
discharge point, or the subsequent users for irrigation must
bear the cost of lifting the city's effluent from the city's new
discharge point upstream to the irrigators' point of diversion. 4 It is true, as explained later in this Comment, that
the cessation of return flow issue is, also, largely a cost allocation question. But the MetropolitanDenver court made it
clear that cessation of return flow and change of point of
return flow are separate issues-junior appropriators do
have the right to return flow and are subject only to the
senior appropriator's right to change the point of return flow.
Although the holding of Metropolitan Denver is not
directed at the issue of cessation of return flow, an argument can be made that the case is authority, in an analogous
fact situation, for an exception to the rule protecting junior
appropriators from changes in stream conditions. The holding of the case has, however, been subject to pointed criticism. " A change in point of return flow can directly cause
loss to juniors (a loss of use of the return flow or a loss due
to the cost of pumping the return flow to the junior appropriators' diversion points) just as can a change of point of
diversion. Thus, it is anomalous to protect junior appropriators from changes in point of diversion, but not changes
in point of discharge."6
In view of the assumption of the Metropolitan Denver
court that continuation of return flow is required, and in
that the holding seems inconsistent with the basic law protecting the vested rights of subsequent appropriators, it is
doubtful that any valuable analogy can be made to that case
for the purpose of solving the cessation of return flow issue.
In the common cases in which return flow is relied upon
by junior appropriators, both upstream and downstream, to
43. Id. at 1192.
44. Id.
45. See Williams, Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 301 (1973).
46. Id. at 306.
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satisfy downstream appropriations, the general rule under
which junior appropriators have the right to prevent changes
which adversely affect their rights is likely to prevent implementation of a total containment system which eliminates
all return flow. A senior appropriator cannot exercise his
rights to the detriment of junior appropriators by "an enlarged or another use, measured either by volume or time. ' 7
Where an appropriator has taken water for a specified
purpose (e.g., mining), he cannot, to the detriment of junior
appropriators, extend the application of water to a new use
or different or additional purpose (e.g., agriculture or
another separate mining operation)." A decision that the
construction of evaporation ponds for pollution control reasons would be equivalent to the construction of a storage
reservoir would not place the total containment user in any
better position since western courts have specifically denied
senior appropriators the right to change direct flow rights
into storage or reservoir rights where such change would
infringe on the rights of junior appropriators."
The change of use rules have not been subject to exception, even for municipalities.5" Consequently, the no-discharge user has a thin chance of success in defending his
right to cease all return flow under change of use rules where
junior appropriators have relied on his return flow for their
appropriations.
Reuse of Water
A viable argument can be made, however, that the initiation of a system of total consumption of polluted water by
evaporation is not a change of use which is subject to the
law protecting junior appropriators, but is a reuse or more
efficient use which is permitted and even encouraged by some
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 26
Colo. 47, 56 P. 185, 187 (1899).
48. McKinney v. Smith, supra note 11.
49. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., supra
note 47; Piute Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation &
Reservoir Co., 13 Utah 2d 6, 367 P.2d 855 (1962).
50. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 38,
at 635; Farmer's Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Town of Lafayette, supra
note 41.
47.
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case law." The appropriator has been said, by some courts,
to be the owner of water and entitled to possession after the
time of diversion for as long as the water remains on his
property or under his control.2 The phraseology of other
courts indicates that water is continually in public ownership, but that the state cedes control during periods of beneficial use by an appropriator." Before the water leaves his
control, the user can recapture it and reuse it as he wishes. 4
As long as he is acting in good faith, a water user is not obligated to continue to supply appropriators of his waste
water. 5 Thus, since he cannot be compelled to waste water,
if he utilizes the water in such a manner that it is entirely
consumed, no junior appropriator can complain.5"
However, where an appropriator has permitted water
to return to the stream for a considerable period of time, a
subsequent appropriator may acquire a prescriptive right
under which he can prevent the discontinuance of such waste
by improvements in the initial appropriator's system." Since
some cases limit the amount of an appropriation to that
contemplated within the scope of the original appropriation 8
or actually applied to beneficial use within a reasonable time
after initial notice of intent to appropriate, 9 the lapse of
time before an attempt to recapture and reuse waste water
may show abandonment of the right to reuse.6 "
51. "It would seem that an appropriator should be commended for recapturing
water that has already been used by himself and applying it again in a
beneficial manner." Barker v. Sonner, 135 Or. 75, 294 P. 1053, 1054 (1931).
52. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074, 1080
(1933); Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866, 867 (1943), reaffirmed, 113 Utah 356, 195
P.2d 249 (1948).
53. Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903). And see Tucker v. Missoula Light & Water Co., 77 Mont. 91, 250 P. 11, 15 (1926).
54. Lambeye v. Garcia, 18 Ariz. 178, 157 P. 977 (1916); Rio Grande Reservoir
& Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 43-7, 191 P. 129
(1920); Barker v. Sonner, supra note 51; Lasson v. Seeley, 120 Utah 679,
238 P.2d 418, 422 (1951); Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., supra note 52, 195 P.2d at 252.
See generally Note, Rights of the Original Appropriator to Recapture
Water Used in Irrigation,11 Wyo. L.J. 39 (1956).
55. Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177, 280 P.2d
426, 428 (1955).
56. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (1957).
57. Dannenbrink v. Burger, 23 Cal. App. 587, 138 P. 751 (1914). Contra,
Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54, 61 (1940).
58. Oliver v. Skinner, 190 Or. 423, 226 P.2d 507, 513 (1951).
59. Union Mill and Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 110 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
60. Jones v. Warmsprings Irrigation Dist., 162 Or. 186, 91 P.2d 542 (1939).
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Except in cases where there may be abandonment of the
reuse right or acquisition of a prescriptive right to receive
waste water, the general rule appears to be that the rights
of junior appropriators to prevent increased consumption
by a senior appropriator are dependent on whether the senior
appropriator has relinquished control of the water before
his reuse begins." The holding of Wyoming Hereford Ranch
v. Hammond Packing Co.6" clarifies the distinction between
usage by the original appropriator before relinquishment of
control and after such event. A junior appropriator has no
right to interfere with a city's practice of selling water to
another user where the transfer is accomplished by depositing city sewage effluent directly into the user's ditch.63 However, sewage deposited back into a stream channel after having been used to the full extent intended by the city becomes
part of the state waters, again subject to appropriation on
the basis of priority, and a buyer of city sewage effluent has
no right to take the water out of the stream by virtue of his
contract with the city."
There is authority, therefore, to support the proposition
that any disposition of water is legal if done by the appropriator, at least if that appropriator is a municipality, before the water leaves its dominion and control. And the
weight of authority holds that any appropriator can recapture waste water before it leaves his control to reuse it or
can reduce waste flow to make more efficient use of the
water.
Total Containment Pollution Control-Change of Use or
Reuse?
The rules with respect to change of use and recapture
of waste water are fairly clear. The right to change the
61. Courts differ as to the specific time and place at which relinquishment of
control is said to occur: when the water begins its journey back to the
stream, Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., supra note 54; when the water leaves the appropriator's land,
Barker v. Sonner, supra note 51; or when the water reenters a natural
stream, Lasson v. Seeley, supra note 54.
62. Supra note 29, at 7q2-73.
63. But see Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 11,
which denied a city the right to sell its purified sewage water.
64. See also Lasson v. Seeley, supra note 54.
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manner of use is dependent upon the vested rights of junior
appropriators, so a change which involves increased consumption and diminished return flow may be prevented by
the junior appropriators. 5 On the other hand, recapture and
reuse of waste water is, in the absence of abandonment of the
right, nearly always held to be within the rights of an appropriator and no junior appropriator can compel continuation
of the waste flow. Although the rules themselves can be
easily stated, the question of which rule applies to the instant
problem is not so easily solved.
While some actions on the part of an appropriator may
be classified without much difficulty as changes of use (e.g.,
a change from agricultural use to municipal use6") or as
reuse or more efficient use (e.g., use for irrigation of a more
productive crop than was previously grown, which leads to
consumption of a greater quantity of water6"), the no-discharge pollution control system seems capable of falling into
either category. Since the immediate discussion presumes a
finding by the court that the utilization of a total containment system is a beneficial use, and since the implementation
of the system is a use new and different from the purification
and discharge operation which the system supposedly replaces, there are characteristics of a change of use. Yet, the
appropriator is taking the waste water which remains after
he first uses the water for ordinary municipal or industrial
use and, before it leaves his control, reapplying it in a manner
which allows his operation to work more efficiently than if
he purified and discharged the water; this looks like a reuse
or more efficient use.
From the cases noted in the above discussion, it can be
inferred that the rules protecting the rights of junior appropriators have generally arisen from situations in which water
rights have been sold to new users for new uses. Attempts
65. The change of use rule is not applied in the case of water imported from
another watershed, as to which the importer has unrestricted rights to
reuse, make successive uses, or make any other disposition of the surplus.
Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1973).
66. City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968) ; Farmers
Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 38.
67. Lasson v. Seeley, supra note 54.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 12 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 2

448

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XII

by an appropriator to improve the efficiency of his own system are more likely to avoid categorization as changes of
use and will be encouraged. This distinction between transfers and internal improvements indicates a significant probability that implementation of a total containment system
will be viewed favorably by courts and classified as a reuse
or more efficient use of water.
However, as was indicated in the introduction to this
Comment, the most valid reason for a distinction between
cases protecting junior rights and cases permitting change
without qualification is that junior appropriators should be
protected from major, disruptive changes by another appropriator, yet incremental improvements in the internal efficiency of one appropriator's system should be encouraged
in order to promote maximum utilization of water. Since no
change could be more significant than total cessation of
return flow, there is a valid reason to subject the user who
implements a total containment system to change of use rules.
The reuse-change of use issue is likely to be hotly debated
in future cases involving the relative rights of users implementing total containment systems and junior appropriators
injuriously affected thereby. But the above discussion should
serve to illustrate that the argument twists itself into no
more than a game of semantics. It is submitted by this author that the issue of legality of total containment systems
should turn, not on an arbitrary classification of the problem as one subject to the change of use rule or one subject to
the reuse or more efficient use rule, but on a policy determination based on the economic and social considerations pervading the problem. A court may answer the classification
question after first analyzing the social and economic impacts of its decision so that the classification made will give
the "right" result; a court with a more direct approach may
recognize the irrelevance of the classification and base its
decision solely on the policy considerations which point quite
directly to an answer to the question of whether a total containment right is consistent with our legal structure and
the goal of maximum utilization of water.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/2
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ECONOMIC IMPACT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

An economic analysis of the total containment problem
indicates that, as with many cases of conflicting rights, 8
the determination of whether cessation of return flow as part
of a total containment waste disposal system is rightful as
against other affected parties will rarely determine whether
or not such systems are implemented; the determination of
legal rights will serve principally to allocate costs among the
affected parties.
A proposal for a total containment system may come
from any water user for whom the evaporation system is less
expensive than the treatment required by state and federal
laws" for water returned to the stream. Whether such a
system will be implemented, however, will be dependent on
the relative costs and benefits to the polluter and to those
who would utilize the polluter's waste water.
In any case where the cost to the user who is producing
impure effluent of purifying the water before returning it
to the stream is greater than the benefits it produces for subsequent users, the original user will not expend the money
necessary to purify the water, and a total containment system is likely to be utilized. This consequence will follow regardless of whether the initial user is held to have the right
to cease return flow-in which case those who would have
been subsequent users will bear the loss, their supply of water
from the first user's return flow being terminated without
compensation-or whether the initial user is held to be without the right to cease return flow to the detriment of junior
appropriators-in which case the initial user will, instead of
purifying his effluent, find it preferable to buy the water
rights of the subsequent users at a price greater than the
discounted benefits which those users will forfeit by parting
with their water rights and less than the discounted costs to
the initial user of operating a continuing purification
program.
68. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
69. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 §§ 301-405, 33 U.S.C. §§ 13111345 (Supp. V 1975); Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.18 (Supp. 1975).
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On the other hand, in those situations where the cost
of treating the polluted effluent and returning it to the
stream is less than the benefits which can be produced by subsequent appropriators' reuse of the water, it is unlikely that
the no-discharge, total containment system would be implemented. Again, this is true regardless of whether the initial
user is held to lack the right to cease return flow-in which
case he will be obligated to bear the expense of purification
as part of the cost of his operation--or whether the use of a
total containment system by the initial user is declared
legally permissible-in which case the subsequent appropriators will pay the initial user to restore the water to usable
quality and return it to the stream since there will be a price
which will cover the initial user's purification costs and still
allow the subsequent users to produce a net benefit.
The above propositions may be a bit overly-broad in that
they ignore the transaction costs present in the real world
and the constraints imposed by our present legal system
which may frustrate the actions necessary to achieve the optimum economic result. Thus, in situations where the purification costs and the benefits which can be produced from subsequent use are not far apart or where relationships are
structured legally for considerations other than optimization
of production, the determination of relative rights may, in
fact, be determinative of whether a total conainment system
will be implemented. But the propositions, truisms in the
normative situation, indicate that generally the determination of whether total containment is rightful serves principally to allocate costs. Consequently, social policy considerations indicating which party should bear the costs involved
will play an important role in determining how the rights of
the parties are to be defined.
In view of the fact that the polluted discharge is a byproduct of the initial user's operation, it would appear that
the costs of purification or of compensating subsequent users
for the loss of water which will result if a total containment
system is implemented should be internalized into the initial
user's operation rather than allowed to fall on other members
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/2
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of the economic community. The internalization of social
costs can be accomplished best by denying users the right to
meet pollution control requirements by containing and evaporating polluted effluent. It will follow from denial of this
right that purification will occur at the expense of the polluter when the cost of doing so does not exceed the benefits
which can be produced by subsequent users relying on the
return flow, and that subsequent users will not be deprived
of the return flow on which they rely unless compensated at
the expense of the polluter.
However, one branch of economic-legal theory teaches
that a judgment such as this concerning which party is
creating a problem and should bear the cost is all too hasty
if it fails to take account of the reciprocal nature of the problem of allocating social costs." To say that the initial user
is polluting and evaporating water is not to conclude, necessarily, that it is he who is imposing an external cost upon
other members of the economic system. One would not be
without support in identifying the cost of water treatment
as an expense associated with the operations of subsequent
users who are imposing a cost on the polluter by demanding
the continued flow of clean water. It is improper, therefore,
to identify either polluters or those who demand preservation
of the environment in its status quo as creators of the pollution problem, for no problem would exist without both.
This analysis will not fully answer any question; it
serves merely to put the question in perspective. The identification of the members of one group within the economic
community as the villains upon whom the obligation to internalize social costs should fall is nothing other than a social
judgment. And that initial judgment has been made. The
producer of pollution is recognized in our system as the creator of the pollution problem; the parties demanding preservation of the water supply in a state near natural quality
are within their rights.71 To say, then, that the social costs
70. Coase, supra note 68.
71. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 §§ 101, 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251, 1311(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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of water pollution are externalities of the polluter's operation is correct, for our collective judgment is that it is he
who is acting outside the bounds of his rights and who should
be forced to internalize the social costs of water pollution.
In order to avoid undue complexity of overlapping rights
in the legal system and to minimize the transaction costs
inherent in the arrangements spawned by the private sector
to fit its productive organization within that system,"2 it is
important that newly formed legal rules be aligned rationally
with the established structure. Having made a socio-political
decision at an earlier time that the acts of polluters are to be
discouraged, our legal system is now structured so that increasingly heavy restrictions are falling upon producers of
water pollution.7" Denial of total containment rights is a
determination which will not only be consistent with present
social philosophy identifying the polluter as the outlaw, but
will serve to align liability for the pollution problem on one
party-the polluter. Resulting from this will be greater
simplification of the process of negotiation between economic
entities to move resources-especially, clean water-to the
producer of greatest marginal benefit.
An additional factor supporting the policy conclusion
that total containment rights should be denied in order that
the costs of correcting the polluted water problem fall on the
polluter is an observation of the identity of the parties. The
producer of large quantities of heavily polluted effluent-the
entity likely to propose a total containment system-will usually be a municipality or industrial plant with the capacity to
72. One of the complications which may arise in private transactions among
water users and which deserves special mention is the uncertainty of the
time period for which total containment systems can be legally used. As
explained in note 27, supra, total containment may be merely an interim
solution to a water user's pollution control problem. Because of the requirements that increasingly effective technology be applied by polluterz and
because of the possibility that "better than best" technology may be required on particular waterways, see Goldfarb, Better Than Best: A Crosscurrent in theFederal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 11
LAND & WATER L. Rav. 1 (1976), the uncertainties in the application of the
law may be such that the parties fail to reach the economic solution that
theoretically should be reached. Thus, it is even more important that the
legal rules be structured to guide activities toward the goal of maximum
utilization of water.
73. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1972 § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp.
V 1975).
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absorb the costs of purification or of total containment (including the cost of compensating subsequent users for the
loss of return flow). These costs will be passed on to the
consumers of water provided by cities or of goods produced
by industrial plants. Consequently, those persons receiving
the benefits of the operations which have created the pollution problems will be obligated to pay the full cost, including
external social costs, of producing the goods and services
which they use.
If, however, the total containment process were held to
be a legally permissible means of meeting water quality control requirements, a distorted cost allocation would result.
The burden of bearing the external costs of the initial user
would fall on subsequent users who would either suffer the
loss caused by cessation of return flow or pay the price of
purifying the initial user's effluent so that it could be returned to the stream for subsequent use rather than evaporated. If each junior right were subject to a right on the
part of prior appropriators to cease return flow, downstream
users would lose their ability to rely on return flow, with a
resulting instability in this portion of the economic system
and discouragement of further capital investment.
Thus, the social and economic realities indicate that an
inequitable, inefficient allocation of resources will result if
the implementation of total containment pollution control
systems is permitted to occur as of right. This, in itself,
should be a sufficient basis to determine the issue of whether
there is a right to terminate all water discharge to avoid
effluent treatment requirements, for it demonstrates that
such action would be wasteful in its effect on the general
economic system. The conclusion that pollution control by
evaporation is wasteful will insure protection of the rights
of present users and insure the opportunity for future applications to beneficial use by later appropriators who will be
able to force termination of wasteful consumption by a nodischarge user.
Such a rule will, however, be of no consequence in those
locations where water resources are of such abundance that
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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total containment and evaporation is an efficient disposition
of water. The determination that consumption by evaporation is waste necessarily assumes a situation in which water
resources are scarce and must be allocated among those making conflicting demands. As previously explained, the concept of beneficial use-the converse of waste-is relative
and varies with changing circumstances. The conclusion of
this article that total containment systems are wasteful in
areas of scarcity does not affect the privilege74 to make virtually unrestricted disposition of water until the time when
increasing demands make a particular disposition unreasonable."'
If the utilization of a total containment pollution control
system is regarded as a beneficial application of water even
where there may be competing demands for the water, the
above social and economic factors suggest, at least, that the
implementation of such a system by an established water
user not be at the expense of other established water appropriators. In order to have the cost of solving the pollution
problem fall on the polluter rather than other members of
the economic system, the implementation of the system appears to be most reasonably categorized, if categorization is
necessary, as a change of use subject to junior rights rather
than a reuse or more efficient use. This conclusion is less
satisfactory than a determination that consumption by evaporation is waste because it provides no protection for future
appropriators who will take subject to the consumption-byevaporation appropriation and will be forced, therefore, to
bear the external costs imposed by the operations of the nodischarge user. Although present water users may be equally
well protected by a decision subjecting a total containment
user to change of use rules as by a disallowance of the system
as wasteful, the analysis of basic economic effects of the
legal determination has indicated no reason for a distinction
between affected producers presently established and those
74. See Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, supra note 26.
75. Those states which make waste a criminal offense recognize that criminal
waste does not occur unless there is a use to the detriment of others. ARIZ.
Rv. STAT. § 45-109 (A) (5) (1956) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-7-4 (Supp. 1975);
Wyo. STAT. § 41-201 (1957).
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who begin their operations in the future. In any case, the
social costs of water pollution are properly imposed on the
polluter.
Myriad cases have held that an appropriator's water
right is a valuable property right."0 But this right is worth
little if upstream users have the right to terminate return
flow on which downstream users have relied. If return flow
is terminated by virtue of the right of the polluter to do so,
there is no taking for which compensation need be paid since
the determination that the cessation of return flow is within
the rights of the initial user is a determination that the property rights of subsequent users are subject to this right. If,
however, the right to consume one's entire diversion by evaporation of effluent is denied, the implementation of a total
containment system will require negotiation and purchase
of other water rights or exercise of the power of eminent domain by the total containment user, for the resulting alteration of conditions of return flow on which junior appropriators have relied at the time of their appropriations is, effectively, a taking of property of the other appropriators.
Thus, saying that a water user should be able to exercise a total containment right only if he compensates injured
parties is equivalent to saying that there is no total containment right, for then the system will be implemented only if
affected parties are compensated by purchase of their rights.
Consequently, if total containment rights are denied, as our
legal and economic structure suggests that they should be,
total containment systems can exist only where the supply
of water is so abundant that there are no adversely affected
parties or where the benefits of subsequent use are sufficiently low that the no-discharge user is able to fully compensate all injured parties.
76. Lindsey v. McClure, supra note 39, at 70; Mitchell Irrigation Dist. v.
Sharp, 121 F.2d 964, 967 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 667 (1941);
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 38,
at 631; Harrer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 147 Mont. 130, 410 P.2d 713, 1715
(1966); Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supra note
29, at 765. Similarly, the right of a riparian proprietor to the reasonable
use of water flowing past his land is property. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway,
supra note 6, at 789.
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CONCLUSION

The concept of reasonable beneficial use and the change
of use-reuse dichotomy can be used to effectively respond to
the issue of legality of total containment water quality control gystems only when applied in conjunction with considerations of the policy of maximum utilization of water, current
social philosophy and the real economic effects of the legal
determinations. Our legal and economic framework suggests
that the social costs of each user's operation should be internalized-that the costs of implementing a total containment
pollution control system or of its alternative, effluent treatment, should be absorbed by the polluter and the consumers
who benefit from the operations causing the water pollution.
Where a total containment system is a feasible pollution control alternative for a water user who discharges effluent
unsuitable for return to the stream, the externalities of his
operation will be internalized only if he is denied the right
to cease return flow in lieu of treating and discharging his
polluted effluent.
ROBERT G. BERGER
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